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THE BREMEN AND THE MODEL CHOICE OF
FORUM ACT

Robert A. Leflar*
The Model Choice of Forum Act,1 promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in
1968, was designed to set standards for the effectuation of contractual
forum-selecting clauses, sometimes called "derogation" or "prorogation" clauses, while restricting their effectiveness to situations in
which their operation would be fair to all concerned parties. The
Commissioners chose not to draft the statute as a Uniform Act to be
recommended for adoption by all the states, but rather as a Model Act
setting out sound standards that might be followed not only by states
drafting their own statutes on the subject but even by courts
establishing common law rules affecting such contractual arrangements. It was the latter effect that was given to the Model Act in Chief
Justice Burger's majority opinion in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co.,2 sustaining a forum-selecting clause in a maritime contract but
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ON UNIFORM
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LAWS, HANDBOOK OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEED-
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CONFERENCE

219 (1968) [hereinafter cited

as

2. 407 U.S. 1 (1972), rev'g In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 296 F. Supp.
733 (M.D. Fla. 1969), affd, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), affd on rehearing,446
F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc). The Fifth Circuit decision rendered en banc
on an 8-6 division of the sitting judges is discussed in Collins, Forum-Selectionand
an Anglo-American Conflict-The Sad Case of The Chaparral,20 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 550 (1971). Other comments on the case appear in Delaume, Choice of
Forum Clauses and the American Forum Patriae;Something Happened on the
Way to the Forum: Zapata and Silver, 4 J. MARITIME L. & COMM. 295 (1973);
Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection Clauses, 19 WAYNE L.
REV. 49 (1972); Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States, 21
AM. J. COMp. L. 124 (1973); 58 CORNELL L.Q. 416 (1973); 11 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (1972); 86 HARV. L. REV. 52 (1972); 13 VA. J. INT'L L.
272 (1972); 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 309 (1972). More comments can be
anticipated.
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announcing limitations beyond which choice-of-forum clauses would
not be enforced.?
Professor Willis L.M. Reese of Columbia was the Reporter and
draftsman for the Model Act.4 He had previously participated in the
drafting and promulgation of the "Convention on the Choice of
Court" by The Hague Conference on Private International Law in
1964, a Convention that has not been adopted by the United States
but that furnished the background for the NCCUSL Model Act
project. Reese also prepared one of the series of studies' presented at
the 1964 New York meeting of the American Foreign Law Association, which in effect accompanied the promulgation of The Hague
Convention.
Several members of Reese's NCCUSL committee had to be
educated at the beginning of their choice-of-forum drafting project.
This was partly because forum-selecting contract clauses had not been
used often in the interior American states, and partly because many
lawyers had not thought much beyond the old legal chestnuts that
"parties may not by agreement oust courts of their jurisdiction" and
"jurisdiction is a matter of law not of contract." These traditional
thought-precluding sets of senseless words have induced a number of
courts in the United States to reject contractual choice-of-forum
clauses virtually without analysis, or on vague and unspecific
assertions of "public policy." 6 Other common law courts, however,
after more specific analysis of the policy factors, have given effect to

3. Chief Justice Burger's opinion cited the Model Choice of Forum Act in
footnotes 13 and 18.
4. See Reese, The Model Choice of Forum Act, 17 Am. J. COMP. L. 292

(1969).
5. Nadelmann, The Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw and the
Validity of Forum Selecting Clauses, 13 AM. J. CoMp. L. 157 (1964); Perillo,
Selected Forum Agreements in Western Europe, id. at 162; Schwind, Derogation
Clauses in Latin-American Law, id. at 167; Eek, The Contractual Forum:
Scandinavia, id. at 173; Cowen & Da Costa, The ContractualForum: Situation in
England and the British Commonwealth, id. at 179; Reese, The Contractual
Forum: Situation in the United States, id. at 187. See also Lenhoff, The Parties'
Choice of Forum: ProrogationAgreements, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 414 (1961).

6. E.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Nashua

River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678 (1916);
Benson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 174 N.Y. 83, 66 N.E. 627 (1903). The
cases are collected in Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300 (1957). See Comment,
Agreements in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign Courts, 10
LA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
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the clauses. 1 English courts have regularly enforced them.' Section 80
of the Conflict of Laws Restatement (Second) approves courtselecting clauses, but not wholeheartedly: "The parties' agreement as
to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction,
but such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or
unreasonable." 9 At any rate, further study convinced the Reese
committee, and ultimately most of the rest of the Commissioners, that
a Model Act providing for enforcement of such clauses in appropriate
circumstances was desirable.
Both the facts and the reasoning in The Bremen tie in excellently
with the politico-economic theory that underlies the Model Choice of
Forum Act. In The Bremen, defendant German corporation was the
low bidder to plaintiff's public advertisement for bids. The German
corporation submitted, at plaintiff Texas corporation's request, a
proposed contract for towage of plaintiff's off-shore oil drilling rig
from Venice, Louisiana, to the Adriatic Sea off Ravenna, Italy. The
submitted contract contained in a prominent position the clause
"[a] ny dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of
Justice." An exemption from liability clause, exculpatory of defendant, valid under English law and apparently under Italian law but
invalid under the law of the United States also appeared in the
submitted contract. Plaintiff's Texas attorneys studied the contract
and, after they changed some of the provisions but not the two clauses
just mentioned, plaintiff signed the contract and returned it to
defendant in Germany where it was completed by defendant's
signature. The oil rig was wrecked while being towed by defendant
during a storm on the Gulf of Mexico; it was then towed to Tampa,
Florida, where plaintiff commenced an action, contrary to the choiceof-forum clause, for the damage to the rig allegedly caused by
defendant's negligence. Separate actions were commenced by the
German corporation in England (on the contract, jurisdiction accepted)"0 and in a Florida state court (to preserve limitations

7. E.g., Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir.
1966); Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Reeves v. Chim Indus.
Ore._
, 495 P.2d 729 (1972); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E.
Co.,Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 209 A.2d 810 (1965).
8. E.g., The Eleftheria, [1970] P. 94; The Fehmarn, [1958] 1 W.L.R. 159
(C.A.). See Cowen & Da Costa, The ContractualForum: Situation in England and
the British Commonwealth, supra note 5.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 80 (1971).

10. Unterweser Reederei G.M.B.H. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (The "Chaparral"), [1968] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 158.
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defenses) but neither of these actions controlled the result in the
principal lawsuit brought by the Texas plaintiff. In the federal district
court, the clause designating the English forum was held to be
ineffectual, so that the Florida action could be maintained in spite of
it." In the Fifth Circuit this decision was affirmed. 12 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 3 In reversing, the majority
(Douglas dissenting) held that the forum-selection clause was binding
unless plaintiff could show that its enforcement would be unreasonable and unfair. The presence of witnesses and the nearness of events,
circumstances that might make the case a little more easily triable in
Florida than in England, were held not to be, by themselves, enough to
require that the contract be disregarded.
An item-by-item check of the facts and reasoning in The Bremen
against the exact provisions of the Model Choice of Forum Act 4 will
be illuminating. Fortunately, the Act is brief, so that its substantive
sections can be quoted in full. They are as follows:
Section 1. [Definitions.] As used in this Act, "state" means any foreign
nation, and any state, district, commonwealth, territory or insular possession of the United States.
Section 2. [Action in This State by Agreement. ]

(a) If the parties have agreed in writing that an action on a controversy
may be brought in this state and the agreement provides the only basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction, a court of this state will entertain the action if
(1) the court has power under the law of this state to entertain the
action;
(2) this state is a reasonably convenient place for the trial of the
action;
(3) the agreement as to the place of the action was not obtained by
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other
unconscionable means; and
(4) the defendant, if within the state, was served as required by law of
this state in the case of persons within the state or, if without the state,
was served either personally or by registered [or certified] mail directed
to his last known address.
(b) This section does not apply [to cognovit clauses] [to arbitration
clauses or] to the appointment of an agent for the service of process
pursuant to statute or court order.
Section 3. [Action in Another Place by Agreement.] If the parties have

agreed in writing that an action on a controversy shall be brought only in
11. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
12. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on
rehearing,446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
13. 404 U.S. 937 (1971).
14. NCCUSL HANDBOOK 219 (1968).
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another state and it is brought in a court of this state, the court will dismiss
or stay the action, as appropriate, unless
(1) the court is required by statute to entertain the action;
(2) the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state, for
reasons other than delay in bringing the action;
(3) the other state would be a substantially less convenient place for
the trial of the action than this state;
(4) the agreement as to the place of the action was obtained by
misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other
unconscionable means; or
(5) it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to
enforce the agreement.
As a starter, the Model Act in section 1 makes no distinction
between international and interstate cases. If the Act were in force, or
if its rules were being followed as a common law matter, it would
apply whether the forum selected by the parties was in another state
or in another country. On that point The Bremen and the Model Act
are clearly in accord.
Section 2 was not directly involved in the Florida action, since the
section relates only to proceedings brought in the state selected by the
contract as forum. The English court, however, by accepting jurisdiction in the action brought on the contract by-the German firm,"
did what section 2 would have required that it do. The High Court of
Justice in London, in which the suit was filed, had power (jurisdiction) under English law to hear such controversies, and service was
secured on the Texas corporation in a manner that not only complied
with English law but also would satisfy the "fair play and substantial
justice" requirements of the United States Constitution's due process
clause. 6 The other provisions of section 2 match corresponding
provisions in section 3, applicable to any forum in which action is
brought in violation of the contractual clause, and will be noted in the
following paragraphs. The conclusion must be that the Model Act, if it
were in effect, would have authorized the High Court of Justice in
London to hear the case.
Section 3 is the part of the Model Act that deals with the situation
in Florida actually passed on by the Fifth Circuit and by the United
States Supreme Court. It provides that on facts such as those found in
The Bremen the court must dismiss the action (or stay it, if that be
more appropriate) "unless" certain opposing conditions are found to
be present.
15. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
16. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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The first of these conditions, involving an inescapable jurisdiction
conferred by local law on the court, clearly was not present in The
Bremen. The Florida court's obligation to exercise jurisdiction was no
more absolute in The Bremen than in any other proceeding brought
on an extrastate transitory cause of action. Florida might have enacted
a statute requiring its courts to hear such cases regardless of party
agreement to the contrary, but Florida had no such statute, and it is
unlikely that any other American state would enact one. It is
conceivable, however, that a state might invalidate forum-selecting
clauses in connection with particular types of claims in which the state
was especially interested or in which special protection for plaintiffs
17
was needed.
As to the second condition, much turns on what is meant by the
plaintiff's inability to "secure effective relief in the other state." In
The Bremen, the exculpatory clause in the parties' contract, substantially reducing if not eliminating much of plaintiff's claim, probably
would be sustained and effectuated in England,"8 but would be
invalid under the United States law that might be applied if the case
were tried in Florida. 9 In other words, plaintiff would probably win
his case, by invalidation of the contractual exculpatory clause, if it
were tried in Florida, but will lose his case, or most of it, in England.
The difference grows out of conflicts rules on choice of governing law.
Is this second Model Act condition designed to assure plaintiffs of trial
in a forum where they will win their cases? It is difficult to believe
that this is the meaning of the condition. Rather, the condition would
seem to assure plaintiffs of the ability to get into court for a fair trial
on the evidence and under the law, including conflicts law, of the
agreed forum. Certainly, that was what the majority in The Bremen

17. This is the effect given to the conferral of jurisdiction on both state and
federal courts by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.
Ry., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (forum-limiting contract made after cause of action
arose). But a court may refuse to hear a FELA case for forum non conveniens
reasons. Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950). Special
protection to defendants, by forbidding the bringing of suits in other states,
would be ineffectual. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 39 (1965); Atchison, T.
& S.F. R.R. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909).
18. This "fact" of foreign (English) law was established in the Florida case by
affidavit.
19. Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697
(1963); Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955). These cases
invalidated exculpatory clauses as applied to negligence on inland waters, and it is
not certain that the same law would be applied when the loss occurs in
international waters. Plaintiff, however, was counting on that application.
Spring, 1973
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thought the law ought to be, and it is what the parties contracted for,
with the towage price presumably reduced in consideration of the
reduced likelihood of liability. To interpret section 3(2) of the Model
Act to mean that a plaintiff can avoid his forum-selection contract
whenever trial at the selected place, as viewed after the dispute arose,
would be less advantageous to him than trial at another place selected
by him will be to make the Act meaningless as an upholder of such
contracts. That was not the purpose of the Act.
The third condition set out in section 3 also requires sensible
interpretation. It does not call for an exact weighing of the
conveniences of trial at one place and the other. The contract would
be disregarded only if trial at the selected place would be "substantially less convenient." Chief Justice Burger in The Bremen
employed the same test, on this point, as does the Act."0 It was true,
of course, that the plaintiff Texans and some of the witnesses who
participated in the Gulf of Mexico catastrophe were closer to Florida
than to London, but it was equally true that the German defendant
and some of its witnesses were closer to London. The London court
had been selected in the first place because it was on neutral ground,
between the parties' headquarters. As the situation was viewed
beforehand when the contract was signed, it was as convenient a place
as could be agreed on. The inconvenience that the Act looks for
is that of both parties and of the court as well and not just the
inconvenience of the party to the contract that becomes the plaintiff.
Furthermore, the inconvenience specified by the Act is not
identical with the inconvenience that might give rise to a forum non
conveniens refusal to hear the lawsuit, nor to a section 1404(a)2 1
transfer of the trial from one federal district court to another. A
forum-selecting clause denied effect as a valid part of the parties'
contract might still be added, however, to the other inconveniences of
trial at a different forum to justify a forum non conveniens dismissal of
the action there in favor of trial at the place named in the contract.2 2
That would achieve the same result as was reached in The Bremen and
as is called for by the Model Act, though the justification would be
the converse of that set out in the Model Act's section 3(3). It would
20. "[I]t should be incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract to
show that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court." 407 U.S. at 18.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
22. In Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1951), a choice-of-forum clause was given this effect as a make-weight to
help in sustaining a forum non conveniens decision.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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achieve a roundabout and partially undercover effectuation of the
forum-selection clause. This theory might serve as a halfway stage in
the abandonment of old rules in states that are not yet quite ready to
accept choice-of-forum clauses as contractually valid. But if the
contract clause is held valid, it will control on facts under which
forum non conveniens might be unavailable.
The fourth condition is the most important of all those prescribed
in section 3, though it was substantially irrelevant in the The Bremen
decision. There was no room for contention on the facts that selection
of the English forum was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the
abuse of economic power or other unconscionable means. The parties
enjoyed equality in bargaining power, and exercised it. Although
defendant prepared the contract in the first place, it was not on a
"take-it-or-leave-it" basis. Plaintiff made a number of changes,
although not in the forum-selecting clause, before signing the contract.
The clause in question was prominent in the document, not obscure in
a boilerplate segment. In no sense was this a mere adhesion contract as
far as plaintiff was concerned. This is of major significance, because
forum-selecting clauses are as susceptible to inclusion in adhesion
contracts, with all the evils of overreaching and general unfairness that
inhere in such contracts, as are any of the other self-serving clauses
that are too often included in form contracts offered to uninformed
and unsuspecting members of the public. Forum-designating clauses in
adhesion contracts ought to be as readily avoidable by the adhering
party as are any other onerous clauses in such contracts.2 3 'It is the
purpose of the Model Act to go at least that far, and perhaps farther
than some states would otherwise go, in making these clauses voidable
at the option of the adhering party.
The fifth condition in section 3 of the Act is the same as the
ultimate emphasis in The Bremen. Assuming no fraud or overreaching,
"the correct approach," said Chief Justice Burger, would be "to
enforce the forum clause specifically unless [plaintiff can] clearly

23. See Arbittier, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion
Contract, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1197 (1963); Bolgar, The Contract of Adhesion: A
Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20 AM. J. COMp. L. 53 (1972); Meyer,
Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of FundamentalBreach, 50 VA. L. REV.
1178 (1964); Oldfather, Toward a Usable Method of Judicial Review of the
Adhesion Contractor's Lawmaking, 16 KAN. L. REV. 303 (1968); Wilson,
Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 172
(1965); Note, Contract Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HARV. L. REV. 494 (1950). See
also Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts and the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 1072 (1953).
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11
show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust ....
"Absent [such showing] there is no basis for concluding that it would
be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his
bargain." 2 The burden is on the party who seeks to avoid the
contract.2 6 This fifth condition in the Model Act is essentially a
catch-all that includes all of the three preceding conditions plus other
unanticipated good reasons for disregarding the contract clause. That
is the sense in which the Supreme Court uses the same language in
summing up its holding. It is fair to say, on the basis of this analysis,
that the Supreme Court has accepted, for the international transactions on which The Bremen stands as precedent, the tests and
standards prescribed by the Model Choice of Forum Act. The case can
almost be taken as an unofficial application and interpretation of the
Act.
There remain, however, some parts of the Act that were not
involved in the case, and some parts of the opinion that may have
bearing on the Act, that should be noted.
Section 2(b) of the Act expressly declares that the Act has no
application to the appointment of an agent for service of process
pursuant to statute or court order. The implication is that the Act
does apply when an agent for service is designated by the parties'
agreement, apart from statute or court order. This approach is borne
out by Chief Justice Burger's statement in The Bremen that the
decision sustaining forum-selection clauses not shown by the resisting
party to be "unreasonable" "is merely the other side of the
proposition recognized by this Court in National Equipment Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent[2 7 ] ... that ... a party may validly consent to be
sued in a jurisdiction where he cannot be found for service of process
through contractual designation of an 'agent' for receipt of process in
that jurisdiction." 2 Such consent to service will often be necessary if
forum-selecting agreements are to be effective practically, and may
appear in the agreement itself. The same test of "reasonableness" is
appropriate to both types of consent. Absent "reasonableness,"
neither type of consent should be sustained. That conclusion is in
keeping with the Supreme Court's current treatment of cognovit

24. 407 U.S. at 15.
25. 407 U.S. at 18.
26. On this issue, the placement of the burden of proof will ordinarily
determine which party prevails. See Note, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 416, 418
(1973).
27. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
28. 407 U.S. at 10.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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clauses,2 9 to the effect that they are not unconstitutional on their
face and will be sustained when knowingly agreed to by parties of
equal bargaining power. The Court's treatment thus leaves open the
probability that cognovit clauses will not be sustained when they
operate unreasonably and unfairly, as between parties of unequal
economic status and bargaining power.3 0 The Model Act, by its use of
the bracketing device in section 2(b) leaves the cognovit clause
problem up to the individual states so that an enacting state may
exclude cognovit clauses from the operation of the Act, or not, as it
pleases. At the same time the bracketing serves to warn courts that use
the Act as a guide to common law principles that cognovit clauses
present a special problem.
The question of the validity of choice-of-forum clauses has often
been analogized to that of the validity of arbitration clauses, which in
an earlier time were frequently deemed void because they operated to
"oust the court of its jurisdiction." The old-time notion that it was
"the first task of a judge to expand his jurisdiction," particularly if his
pay depended on fees in the cases filed before him, has long since
faded out, and is no longer either a motive or a reason for invalidating
these clauses. 3 Very nearly the same reasons support both choice-offorum and arbitration clauses, but there are enough differences in
their operative effects to require that they be looked at separately.
Most of the five conditions set out in section 3 of the Model Act
would be inappropriate as conditions to the enforcement of arbitration contracts, and nothing in the Model Act is applicable to them.3 2
Choice of forum is almost inevitably bound up with choice of law.
Choice-of-forum clauses often include a choice-of-law provision as
well, the stated choice of governing substantive law being more often
than not that of the state chosen as forum. Even in the absence of a
specific choice of the forum's law, such a choice favoring forum law
may be implied. When the chosen forum is neutral, unconnected with

29. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (cognovit
clause sustained); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (validity depends on
specific facts).
30. See Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (1961); cf. Atlas Credit Corp.
v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
31. Judge Wisdom made this point in his dissent in The Bremen in the Fifth
Circuit. 428 F.2d at 899.
32. No such conditions are imposed under the Uniform Arbitration Act,
promulgated in 1955 and since adopted in several of the states. 9 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN.

76 (1957); 9 UNIFORM

LAWS ANN.

39 (Supp. 1967).
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the physical facts of the transaction contracted about, as was the case
in The Bremen, there will usually be no choice-of-law provision, but
the conflict of laws rules at the chosen forum are apt to favor
substantive rules similar to its own law, if similar rules are to be found
in the law of any state substantially connected with the transaction. 3
That was the dire assumption of the plaintiff in The Bremen, who
apparently took it for granted (as did the United States Supreme
Court) that the English court would hold valid the contract's
exculpatory clause, as it would be under English law and under the
laws of some of the other countries through whose waters the oil rig
was to be towed, even though it would be void by United States
law. 34 If England's bases for choice-of-law decision included an
above-the-table preference for "the better law,"' 35 which they do not,
an English court might conclude overtly that the rule sustaining
exculpatory agreements as furthering free enterprise in international
trade is "better law" than the opposite rule in the United States. That
could have been another reason for the conflicts decision that an
English court would reach on the substantive choice-of-law problem,
though it would not be the reason stated by the English court,3 6 as
English conflicts law stands today. Nevertheless, it must be realized
that the Model Choice of Forum Act says nothing about the validity
of choice-of-law clauses or about the effect of choice-of-forum clauses
on choice of law. And The Bremen treats the relation between the
two matters as being of neglible importance, at least to the extent of
holding that potential differences in choice-of-law decisions do not
defeat an otherwise valid choice-of-forum clause in the parties'
contract. The effect of the Act, and inferentially of the decision, in

33. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 218, 224 (1968). The late
Professor Brainerd Currie has summarized the governmental interest analysis as a
choice-of-law guide: "5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict
exists between the interests of two other states, and the court cannot with justice
decline to adjudicate the case, it should apply the law of the forum, at least if that
law corresponds with the law of one of the other states." W. REESE & M.
ROSENBERG, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

523-24 (6th ed. 1971).

34. Correspondingly, it was assumed that the United States court in Florida
would determine the validity of the exculpatory clause by United States law, and
hold it invalid. See note 19 supra.
35. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 254 (1968).
36. Similarly, a stated or unstated preference for what it regards as "the
better law" might to some extent explain why the federal court would apparently
have selected United States law as governing.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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the direction of encouraging party autonomy in choice-of-law determination3" is incidental, not specific.
The explicit precedential effect of The Bremen apparently is limited
to admiralty cases involving contracts for international transactions.
Within that area it is like a common law decision by the area's highest
American court. Even though it is technically not a common law
decision, it has all the normal characteristics of one. Similarly, though
the Model Choice of Forum Act has the form of a statute rather than
of a common law rule, in actual effect it suggests a rule (the bundle of
subsections in the Model Act really adds up to one total rule) that
could well be accepted, like a Restatement section, by any common
law court. Considered together, The Bremen and the Model Act afford
strong and excellent authority for such an acceptance by state
common law courts, and for forum-selecting clauses in all sorts of
contracts. By the same token, if the concept of federal common law is
to be extended to the mass of international transactions and problems
(to which the application of fifty or more state and territorial rules
can produce contradictory confusion harmful to the national interest),
as it undoubtedly should be extended, 3 8 then The Bremen decision
and the Model Act afford an excellent statement of what the new
federal common law rule should be. It may fairly be hoped that,
together, they set out the substance of future American law on the
effectiveness of choice-of-court agreements, for both interstate and
international litigation.

37. See A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 44, 179
(1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186, 187
(1971); Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341 (1952);
Note, Party Autonomy: Pastand Present,12 S. TEx. L. J. 214 (1970).
38. Cf. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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